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The use of commercial "off the shelf" products, commercial
standards and business practices to meet Defense material needs
is receiving increasing attention. Defense acquisition policy-
makers believe that using commercial products and standards is
one way to reduce acquisition costs while still meeting mission
needs .
This thesis is a history and analysis of a successful ship
acquisition program which utilized commercial standards and
practices. Two current ship acquisition programs using the
same concept are briefly described. The intent is to illus-
trate the development of the acquisition concept and the
project manager's strategy as well as describe the planning
and execution of the program. Significant management problems
were encountered due to use of commercial standards and prac-
tices. Emphasis is given to their solution. Contractor and
ship operator evaluations of the program are provided.
Several recommendations are made concerning use of commercial
standards and practices for future acquisition programs.
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In recent years there has been an increasing level of
interest in greater use of commercial products and practices
to meet Defense material needs. Such programs as CCAP, Com-
mercial Commodity Acquisition Program, have been initiated to
increase the amount of defense requirements met by "off the
shelf" commercial products. There have been other initiatives
to reduce the level of military "uniqueness" in material proc-
urements. There now exist DoD directives requiring that
military specifications and standards be "scrubbed and tailored'
before being contractually invoked. Not only specifications
and standards are receiving attention, however; Defense
Department business practices are also being scrutinized for
there is little doubt that they are often a barrier to
commercial product acquisition.
The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the development
and management of a defense acquisition program using com-
mercial standards and practices. All phases of the acquisition
are analyzed in order to demonstrate the types of problems
likely to be encountered in managing such a program.
The program was unique in that commercial standards and
practices were used to acquire relatively complex products;
two oceanographi c research ships. The ships were part of the
FY 1971 Navy shipbuilding program and were bailed, or loaned,
12

to two private academic institutions in furtherance of the
Navy's oceanographi c research programs after delivery.
The program had a relatively low priority within the total
Navy shipbuilding program, therefore, funding was constrained.
As a result, the program sponsor and the project manager found
it necessary to develop a ship acquisition concept new to the
Navy; they chose to buy a modified commercial design vessel
and to adapt their usual business practices to the commercial
environment in which these ships were being produced.
Two separate programs using the same acquisition concept
are now proceeding under the same project office. These two
programs are briefly described to further illustrate use of
the concept.
B. RESEARCH METHOD
In conducting research for this study all pertinent records
available in the Naval Sea Systems Command Auxiliary, Amphib-
ious and Special Mission Ship Project Office (NAVSEA PMS-383)
and the Defense Contract Administration Services Office, Houston,
Texas, were utilized. Interviews were conducted with PMS-383,
NAVSEA Contracts Branch, Navy Office of General Counsel and
Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy personnel. Outside of
the Government; Texas A&M University, University of Hawaii
and contractor personnel were contacted.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Section II describes the background and evolution of
oceanographi c research vessels with emphasis on the U.S. Navy's
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involvement. The significance of the offshore oil supply boat
is also discussed. The process through which the AGOR-21
Class vessels were acquired is presented in Section III.
Section IV is included so that the reader may acquire a
perspective on the success of the program. Section V provides
a brief look at current and future programs utilizing the same
acquisition concepts. In section VI conclusions are presented
regarding the key management problems faced when using commer-
cial standards and practices in defense programs.
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II. OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VESSELS: BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Benjamin Franklin is credited with being the first American
oceanographer, although the word "oceanographer" did not appear
in the English language until 1883. He was responsible for the
charting of the Gulf Stream while serving as Postmaster General
of the Colonies. It seems that it took the mail from England
too long to reach the Colonies because the mail packets were
stemming the current instead of crossing it. [1]
This anecdote demonstrates that the United States has a
long history of involvement in oceanography and hydrography,
or undersea mapping. A long line of vessels have served in the
oceanographi c research role, most part-time, and relatively
few built specifically for oceanographi c work.
During World War II the U.S. Navy was in great need of
oceanographi c research for defense needs. Lacking internal
resources, the Navy turned to private and academic institutions
for needed expertise. Various and sundry vessels were acquired
and converted for use as platforms by the institutions. [1]
After the war the Government continued to support oceano-
graphic research at universities and other private insitutions
through the Navy and other agencies. The Navy expanded its
own internal research program at the same time. The "fleet"
supporting all the research activity during the decade after
the war consisted almost entirely of conversions; no ship
16

having been designed and built specifically for oceanographi c
research since 1931. [1]
In 1952 the Office of Naval Research established a ship
panel within the oceanographi c community. This panel produced
a study that was the impetus for further conferences and studies
which eventually resulted in the design of the AGOR-3 class
oceanographi c research ship by the Navy Bureau of Ships.
In 1957 the third National Academy of Sciences Committee
on Oceanography (NASCO) was established. The NASCO report,
published in 1959, highlighted a growing concern with oceano-
graphic research and the need for larger and more capable
ships. [ 1
]
The Navy followed the NASCO effort with its Ten Year
program in Oceanography (TENOC). The TENOC report recommended
a ten year construction program for forty ships. TENOC
actually engendered the construction of the previously designed
AGOR-3 class ships. [1] Eleven of the Class were built between
1960 and 1969.
Further conversions and some new construction were completed
during the 1960's. The Navy funded the construction of twenty
new vessels, half the TENOC goal, while other agencies and
private institutions provided sufficient numbers to exceed
the forty ship goal. [2]
Entering the Seventies, some institutions supporting the
Navy's oceanographi c program were still using old, ill-suited
and uneconomical converted ships. With funding constrained by
17

the Vietnam war, the Navy found itself unable to continue
building large, mul ti -di sci pi i ne research ships which cost in
the neighborhood of $6 million at the end of the 1960's. For
example, the cost of an AGOR-3 Class ship increased from $2,638
million to $5,038 million between 1962 and 1969 due to infla-
tion. [ 3 ]
As a result of continually shrinking Navy Oceanographi c
research budgets and rising costs, it became increasingly
evident that the Navy and its institutional supporters had to
find or design a low cost and flexible platform if support of
Navy programs was to be maintained. For example, operating
costs (crew salaries, maintenance, fuel and consumables) began
to escalate dramatically, as much as twenty-four percent be-
tween FY 1974 and FY 1975, so that it was imperative that
smaller, simpler ships be built. [3] Operating funds for ships
operated by other institutions, whether Government owned or
not, are now largely provided by the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF). Formerly, that is in the 1960's, most funding
was provided by the Office of Naval Research.
B. THE OFFSHORE OIL SUPPLY BOAT
In the mid-1960's several farsighted individuals in the
oceanographi c community noted that the U.S. oil industry was
using an inexpensive, but very capable class of ships for
offshore supply and seismic research work. This hull type,
popularly known as the offshore oil supply boat (OSB), was
being produced in large numbers as a standard design in a wery
18

competitive environment by a nucleus of about eight small
shipyards centered on the Gulf Coast. The OSB design was a
natural commercial development of the World War II LCI and
related types of landing craft.
In the mid-1960's OSBs were sized in the 125 to 165 foot
range lengthwise, with a 30 to 38 foot beam and a 9 to 1 1 foot
hull depth. They possessed good deck space, range, endurance,
speed and stability, but lacked certain seakeeping abilities. [4]
At the time OSBs were being built at a cost of between
$650,000 and $1 million. They were operated with a nine man
crew, thereby minimizing operating costs. They were all built
at under 300 gross tons thus avoiding U.S. Coast Guard regu-
lation as it applies to machinery, materials, habitability and
manning levels. [5] Since crew costs -are nearly forty percent
of operating costs, it was crucial that these ships be sized
below the 300 gross ton threshold.
In 1964 Texas Instruments, Inc. performed a study on res-
earch ship characteristics preparatory to acquiring ships for
seismic survey charter business. The design that came closest
to fulfilling their needs was the OSB. In 1965 Texas Instru-
ments contracted for two ships of modified OSB design. The
two ships were built in a small Texas yard at a cost of less
than $750,000 each less payload costs. [4]
Gross tonnage is a volumetric measure to which personnel man-
ning standards are keyed by U.S. law. The key threshold is at
300 gross tons since any U.S. flag vessel over that size must
carry the same numbers of qualified crew members as a merchant
ship of 4,000 tons.
19

Other studies by private institutions confirmed the feas-
ibility of the OSB as a research platform. The continuing
evolution of the OSB and their increasing numbers on the oceans
helped to foster the dialogue within the oceanographi c community
The OSB's low construction and operating costs, plus its large,
open main deck aft, where oceanographi c research payloads could
be carried, made it the most attractive platform to replace the
small conversions in the oceanographi c fleet.
20

III. AGOR-21 CLASS OCEANOGRAPHI C RESEARCH
VESSELS: ACQUISITION HISTORY
A. PROGRAM INITIATION
1 . Organizational Res pons i bi 1 i ties
The Oceanographer of the Navy (OCEANAV) is assigned as
the Director, Naval Oceanographi c Program for the CNO by
authority of SECNAVINST 5430.79. As such, the Oceanographer
is the mission sponsor representing the users, the Naval
Oceanographi c Office (NAVOCEANO), Navy laboratories and the
private institutions that support Navy programs.
The Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS), now the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), has always been responsible
for building ships for the Navy. The Oceanographer, in order
to establish responsibilities and working relationships
regarding oceanographi c ships, negotiated a written agreement
with NAVSHIPS in September 1970. This agreement established
direct contact between OCEANAV and the NAVSHIPS Project Manager
responsible for oceanographi c ships. Establishment of the
communication channel, provision for User Representatives and
creation of a OCEANAV Liaison Officer billet on the Project
Manager's staff were the most significant elements of the
agreement.
The User Representative was a concept borrowed from
the private institutions and commercial shipowners who routinely
station an Owner's Representative in the shipbuilder's yard
to represent their interests. In this case the User Repre-
sentatives were to represent the interests of the particular
21

institution to which the Navy would provide the ship even
though the Navy would retain ownership. A \/ery important
function performed by the User Representative was that of
liaison with the Navy's contract administration office
responsible for the contract. This concept later proved to






The mission of the AGOR-21 class vessels, generally,
is to conduct oceanographi c research in support of the Naval
Oceanographi c Program. Specifically, the ships are intended
to support various mul ti -di sci pi i ne programs both in basic and
applied oceanography and in education. The ships are intended
to operate worldwide from fringe ice to the tropics and be
capable of limited handling and service of small deep research
vehicles and towing of deep sea buoys. [6] The mission is
obviously al
1
-encompassi ng and accomodates the desires of many
people within the oceanographi c community. A design of con-
siderable flexibility was needed to meet this mission require-
ment.
3. Design Characteristics
Input from the oceanographi c institutions, both
Government and private, led to the development of a set of
ship characteristics based on the 300 gross ton OSB design.
The objective of OCEANAV and NAVSHIPS was to formulate charac-
teristics that (1) were acceptable to the CNO Ship Characteristics
22

Board (SCB), (2) would provide flexibility enough to meet the
mission, (3) would provide for a platform economical to build
and operate and (4) be close enough to the basic OSB design to
attract that segment of the shipbuilding industry.
The SCB issued the approved Characteristics for the
class on 20 April 1970. The document stated bluntly that,
"the design shall be based on the basic commercial offshore
oil exploration ship." The use of commercial standards was
specifically called out. In this case the standards were those
in general use in commercial shipbuilding. There are four
regulatory bodies that impose commercial shipbuilding standards;
(1) the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), (2) the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), (3) the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) and (4)
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The ABS is a private organization that provides inspec-
tion and certification services to ship owners. They publish
construction standards for various classes of ships and
inspect and certify based on those standards. Their service
is used almost • uni versal ly in the U.S. commercial ship con-
struction and repair industry. Payment for ABS services is
made by the shipyard and is included as part of the contract
price.
The USCG is primarily interested in safety. They
enforce Federal regulations in such areas as damage control
features, lifesaving equipment and manning levels. They
approve plans, inspect and certify just as does ABS.
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The PHS is concerned with the sanitation, food service
and habitability aspects of the vessel. They also inspect and
issue a certificate.
The FCC sets minimum standards for communication
facilities and provides a certificate indicating their standards
have been met.
Most of the above standards are required by law and the
commercial .shipowner cannot operate without them. They are the
baseline standards which all builders meet as a matter of course
They are, however, not as stringent as the Navy's standards for
military vessels that are built for the combat environment. In
addition, the Navy's inspection or quality assurance procedures
are much more onerous, generate more paperwork and require more
manpower for both the Navy and the builder.
Since the AGOR-21 Class mission involved non-combatant
work with a civilian crew, the commercial standards were
considered adequate and more cost-effective. In addition to
requiring use of commercial standards, the SCB Characteristics
specifically stated that compliance with the General Specifi-
cations for Ships of the U.S. Navy, NAVSHIPS Technical Manuals
and other military requirements were not required. Other
major requirements of the SCB were the 300 gross ton limitation
and use of a civilian crew whether the ships were operated by
the Navy or private i ns ti tutuions . [6]
The concern of the Project Manager that the design be
as close as possible to the OSB was demonstrated in an April
24

1970 letter in response to a Naval Ship Engineering Center
(NAVSEC) letter questioning the watertight integrity standard
of the proposed hull design. The Project Manager stated in
part, "This procurement is intended to utilize the expertise
of the segment of the shipbuilding industry which builds such
vessels for the oil industry." The changes proposed by NAVSEC
were of a nature that would have altered the design to such a
degree that there would have been no advantage left in a
commercial vessel acquisition. In the end, NAVSEC's insti-
tutional design review role was abrogated by the Project
Manager for the AGOR program and the basic OSB design concept
remained intact.
In order to provide the flexibility required for mis-
sions the concept of "portability" was utilized for all pay load
equipment. The SCB Characteristics required large, free working
areas and the capability to changeover oceanographic equipment
while in port, but without shipyard facilities. The porta-
bility concept for the highly specialized, largely one-of-a-
kind payload machinery established the basis for the following:
a. Payload changes
The operational capability to change payload
oceanographic equipment between mission voyages with a minimum
of physical installation effort aboard ship, consequently with
minimum turnaround time between voyages, was provided.
Different oceanographic missions, while all under the general
umbrella of oceanography, require different equipment to be
25

aboard the ship. For example, a voyage devoted to geological
oceanography requires equipment for taking bottom samples and
bottom coring for soils analysis. A mission devoted to biology
requires nets, net handling gear and aquaria. Building into
the ship the equipment for all these functions would result
in an oversized ship with equipment going to sea that would
not be used much of the time.
b. New Equipment Installation
The state of the art in oceanographic equipment
is constantly evolving and changing, driven by the basic
nature of research. New and experimental equipment is often
developed to meet these needs and can be installed aboard
ship readily when the ship is equipped in accordance with the
portability concept.
c. Shores ide Equipment Maintenance
Preventative and repair maintenance can be done
between voyages while the unused equipment is shoreside thus
maximizing operational availability when aboard ship.
d. Separate Procurement of Specialized Equipment
Since the specialized equipment must be portable
and the ship built to accomodate and facilitate portability,
procurement of the equipment separate from the ship is
allowed. Thus the shipbuilder is insulated from this equip-
ment, which is unfamiliar to him, and he is allowed to concen-
trate on building ships unencumbered by the unique requirements
for design, construction and testing of strange equipment.
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The Government contracts directly to the segment of industry
that are specialists thus avoiding the learning, middle-man
and cost problems the shipbuilder would experience. The equip-
ment is installed after ship delivery thus avoiding the problems
of cost and timing in providing large quantitites of unique
6FE.
All payload components, which were procured separately by
the Project Manager through the NAVOCEANO contracts office,
were provided with fittings to make them portable, i.e., easily
removable from the ship's decks. These components did not
require any systems integration as do combatant ship weapons
and electronics equipments. In addition to winches and gear
handling equipment; vans for stowage, laboratories, dormitories,
mi ni -computers and other scientific electronics were procured.
The special feature on the ships permitting this capability was
bolt-down fittings on exterior decks and in interior laboratory
and stowage areas.
The characteristics that emerged from the SCB were largely
those of the OSB unencumbered by extraneous military require-
ments. The user-producer dialogue established between the
private institutions and NAVSHIPS, via OCEANAV and the Navy-NSF
coordinating committee on oceanography, was very productive in
evolving a viable set of design goals.
4. Programmi ng
OCEANAV, with the backing of the Navy-NSF coordinating
committee, proposed a twelve ship AGOR (300 GT) class starting
27

with the FY 1970 budget. The ships were to be built at the
rate of two per year for six years. The request was deleted
from the FY 1970 budget; however, two ships were programmed in
the FY 1971 budget. These two ships were redesignated AGOR
UTILITY, or AGOR (U), and were eventually assigned hull numbers
AGOR-21 and AGOR-22. The first two ships became the only two
ships as the remaining ten ships of the proposed class were
never programmed. In the opinion of the OCEANAV people involved
the two ships that were programmed were authorized and left
intact simply because they were small and inexpensive. Figure

















With the approval of a commercial design, the Project
Manager was then faced with the more difficult problems of
(1) finding a suitable procurement procedure, (2) adapting
to commercial business practices within the limitations of law
and regulations and (3) convincing at least one of the OSB
builders to accept a Government contract.
PMS-391 early on had studied various Government procure-
ment procedures in search of a method successfully used to
acquire a boat or ship of commercial design. The Army Corps
of Engineers procurement of sixty-five foot towboats and the
Maritime Administration's procurement of the hydrographic ship
FERREL served as examples. The FERREL, which is operated by
the Environmental Sciences Service Administration, was based
on a small size OSB design.
The New Orleans District, Corps of Engineers, recommended
the two-step formal advertising procedure as a suitable method
of procurement
. [7] MARAD successfully used the same method in
acquiring the FERREL. After studying the details of the Army
and MARAD acquisitions, PMS-391 prepared an Advance Procure-
ment Plan (APP) setting forth two-step formal advertising per
ASPR 2-502 as the procurement method. It was proposed that the
procurement be firm-fixed price and a total set-aside for small
business. The set-aside was a device to help restrict the
bidding to competent OSB builders, most of whom were small
business (less than 1,000 employees). Adequate design and
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price competition was anticipated from these builders. The
APP was approved without comment by NAVMAT on 15 July 1970.
Step one of the ASPR two-step procedure calls for the
bidders to submit an unpriced technical proposal based on a
general statement of mission and technical requirements.
PMS-391 prepared a document called the Circular of Requirements
(COR) based on their knowledge of OSBs and input gathered in
meetings with all the proposed vessel users and OCEANAV. The
COR, which is included herein as Appendix A, was general in
nature; cited the regulatory standards, particulars of design,
features required to modify the standard OSB for oceanographi c
research and software, trials and spares requirements. A
vessel patterned after the standard 165 foot OSB was desired.
The COR was jointly approved by PMS-391 and OCEANAV on 9
March 1971. It was then used as an integral part of the Request
for Unpriced Technical Proposals in step one of the procure-
ment procedure.
After approval of the APP and COR, PMS-391 developed an
al
1
-encompass i ng Ship Acquisition Plan (SAP). The SAP incorp-
orated the APP and also contained general management, financial,
ILS, scheduling and risk control plans.
In consonance with the basic concept of tailoring the
project to a commercial acquisition, the SAP delineated the
following requirements:
1. Commercial regulatory body standards, inspection





3. An abbreviated ILS effort calling for initial spares
with user responsibility for further support.
4. Use of the builder's own specification developed as
part of step one of the procurement procedure.
Just as importantly, the SAP prohibited the following:
1. Government furnished property, equipment or information.
2. Military specifications or standards.
3. Government plan or technical data approval.
4. Formal inspection or quality assurance programs.
Use of a competitively awarded FFP contract in conjunction with
the above mentioned requirements and prohibitions was considered
a low risk approach, therefore, the SAP was approved by the
Commander, NAVSHIPS on 23 June 1971.
The initial problem was to eliminate where possible those
practices and requirements known to be offensive to the prospec-
tive bidders. This meant deviation from standard operating
procedures and conflict with elements within NAVSHIPS and some
resultant compromises. To duplicate the business practices
of the OSB industry was of course impossible for the Navy.
Normally, private customers negotiate with the OSB builders
based on one of the builder's standard designs with modi-
fications to suit the customer's particular needs. The builders
often proceed based on a handshake with formal contract sig-
natures coming later. Customers put between ten and twenty-
five percent of contract price down at the time of contract
execution with other payments coming at specified milestones
during construction. Exhibit 1 is a summary of the business
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Summary of Business Practice Issues (Continued)












An example of a commercial practice which PMS-391 proposed
using was the milestone payment method. PMS-391 proposed the
milestone schedule shown in figure 2 to replace the standard
NAVSHIPS progress payments procedure. The standard procedure
was considered too complicated, would impose an unnecessarily
heavy administrative burden on the builder and require Navy
inspection far beyond the scope desired for this acquisition:
Figure 2.
Proposed AGOR(U) Milestone Payment Schedule
1. 10% of contract price at time of contract execution.
2. 5% at time of keel laying.
3. 10% at time of completion of hull plating.
4. 10% at time of bolting down of main machinery.
5. 10% at completion of the electrical installation
6. 10% at completion of all tank testing.
7. 10% at completion of all joiner work.
8. 10% at completion of dock trials.
9. 10% at completion of sea trials.
10. 10% at delivery of ship to the Government.
11. 5% at completion of the guarantee period.
The milestones were also an important part of the Navy's
limited inspection program, i.e., inspections were made for
payment purposes, but included correction of deficiencies up
to that point. The deficiencies were judged with the con-
tractor's own specification as the standard. The milestone
procedure, along with regulatory body inspections, negated the
need for the Quarterly Production Progress Conferences normally
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held on Navy shipbuilding programs. PMS-391 viewed this
"carrot and stick" approach as simpler and more appropriate in
dealing with the OSB builders. NAVSHIPS Legal Counsel and
Contracts personnel considered the proposed clause to be too
risky since the normal physical progress review by Navy per-
sonnel would not be conducted. After much dialogue it was
agreed that milestones could be used, but only to define the
percentage of physical progress within the context of the
standard NAVSHIPS payments clause. Moreover, the milestones
were altered somewhat; the initial 10% milestone was considered
to be an unauthorized advance payment and the final milestone
was unnecessary because the standard clause provided for a
guaranty period witholding, so both were deleted.
One element of the PMS-391 strategy not reflected in the
formal planning documents was the external marketing of the
program. The Project Manager and his principal assistant for
oceanographi c ships vi s i ted' several of the OSB builders. This
was done to generate interest in the project and to explain the
modified business practices PMS-391 intended to use. Prelim-
inary inquiries soliciting interest in the program were sent
to twelve builders. The inquiry consisted of a letter of
explanation, directions to proposers, the COR and a pro-forma
contract. Issues highlighted in the letter were (1) use of the
builder's own commercial specification, (2) the lack of military
requirements, (3) no Government furnished property, (4) little
government inspection, (5) milestone payments and (6) a promise
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to hold paperwork to a minimum. The thrust of the letter was
to quiet the fears of the small, relatively unsophisticated
builders that they would be overrun by Government inspectors
and enmeshed in technicalities and red-tape. The effort was
considered successful at the time because several yards
expressed interest in bidding.
C. PROCUREMENT ACTIONS
1 . Development of the Pro-Forma Contract
Piecing together the procurement package was a time
consuming effort as it was necessary to convince the Contracts
Directorate and Legal Counsel of the necessity to delete or
modify many standard contract clauses and add some special
features. Exhibit 2 is a summary of the alterations.
The aforementioned conflict regarding the milestone
payments procedure was one in which a satisfactory compromise
was reached with Contracts and the Production Progressing
division.
Controversy also arose over the User Representative
concept. The Contracts people felt that having such a person
in the builder's yard would lead to constructive changes.
It must be remembered that during this period, 1969-1971, many
large shipbuilding claims were being submitted to NAVSHIPS,
Constructive changes are changes to the scope of a contract
initiated by the action or inaction of a Government represent-
ative, either verbally or in writing, which are not authorized
by the Contracting Officer in writing. The majority of actions




and they were understandably very sensitive to the constructive
change issue. By this time it had been decided that the
individual serving as OCEANAV Liaison Officer on the PMS-391
staff would become the User Representative in the builder's
yard with the title of Resident Project Officer, USN (RPO).
In view of the fact that this individual was instrumental in
developing the entire project, being one of the "farsighted
individuals" mentioned in Chapter II, the Contracts people
felt that the Navy policy of separation of "requisitioning"
and "administrative" powers would be compromised if the RPO
were given any authority to direct the contractor. It had
been proposed informally that the RPO be given a limited
contracting officer warrant since it was anticipated that the
contractor would be a small yard not then covered by or close
to a USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding Office (SUPSHIP). Contracts
strongly opposed a warrant, but PMS-391 insisted on its own
RPO. Legal Counsel eventually facilitated a compromise of
sorts by proposing insertion of a changes clause used in con-
struction contracts. This clause, found in the Navy Procurement
Directives, carefully circumscribes and limits the conditions
under which a contractor may claim a constructive change order.
Additionally, the last paragraph of the clause provides for
contracting officer designation of a representative empowered
to direct the contractor's efforts within a specified, limited
scope. Contract's concern about constructive changes was thus



















NPD 7-103. 2/NPC No. 18 (10/27/70 used
in lieu of usual clause for constructive
change avoidance and Contracting Officer
Representative coverage.
Milestone method of computing progress
substituted for normal method within
NAVSHIPS Payment clause. Milestones
based on commercial practice.
Established contractor responsibility.
Disputes in regard to equipment/material
settled by having contractor provide
that which was installed on ship named




3 standard NAVSHIPS clauses deleted.
Modified Standard Form 32 clause
included to give Navy right to inspect





Clause modified to treat Controllable
Pitch Propellor System as a separate
end product.
Clauses (ASPR 1-1707. la, 1-1707. 21c,
1-1707. 3b) deleted. Design and costs
controlled by commercial market.
Following clauses deleted as inapplicable
or because coverage provided in speci-
fication: Military Security (ASPR
7-104-12), Qualified Products-Components
(ASPR 1-1107. 2b), Logistic Support
Requirements (NAVSHIPS), Subcontracts
(ASPR 7-104. 23a), Equal Opportunity
Pre-Award Clearance of Subcontracts








Estimates (NPD 26-208. 1c), Limitation
of Price and Contractor Obligation
(ASPR 7-104. 47a), Cancellation of
Items (ASPR 1-322. 5b) and Required




to give the RPO more authority if needed, although, as it
turned out Contracting Officer Representative designation was
never requested.
Unique among Navy shipbuilding contracts was the Speci-
fications article of the Special Provisions. The article pro-
vided for incorporation of the contractor prepared specification,
from step one of the two-step procedure, as the contract spec-
ification. The article holds the contractor responsible for
the completeness, thoroughness and adequacy of the specification.
The article also provided for settlement of disputes regarding
the type of equipment or material provided by having the
contractor provide that which was installed on a like type of
ship previously built by the contractor and named in the
article. The intent of these provisions was to resolve problems
quickly at a low level, and in retrospect, that goal was met.
Although not controversial, the Liquidated Damages article
of the contract is worthy of mention. The greatest worry of
PMS-391 was that, through builder error, the vessels would
admeasure over 300 gross tons. Therefore, a provision was
inserted allowing assessment of $250,000 liquidated damages if
the ships exceeded that threshold. The amount was actually
small compared with the excess life-cycle costs in the form of
increased manning and added safety equipment that would be
incurred if the limit was exceeded. The delivery schedule was
not as critical as it is for most combatant ship contracts,
but the article did provide for a $500 per day per vessel
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assessment after a one month grace period with a top limit of
$30,000. Deliveries were to be fourteen and fifteen months
after date of award, respectively. PMS-391 had confidence in
OSB builder's ability to meet the delivery schedule, however,
some leverage was desired should the contractor decide to
divert his efforts toward keeping his steady commercial
customers happy.
PMS-391 was successful in a generalized effort to reduce
boilerplate in the contract. The idea was to present a
simpler, less imposing document that would not frighten the
OSB builders, all neophytes in Government contracting. In
particular, all clauses regarding inspection systems, military
security and qualified products were deleted. Other clauses
such as Government Property, weight control, spare parts
provisioning and value engineering were made inapplicable by
the acquisition plan and were also deleted.
2 . Solicitation, Evaluation and Award .
Upon settlement of all issues concerning the pro-forma
contract, a Request for Unpriced Technical Proposals was pre-
pared in order to proceed with step one of the procedure
prescribed in ASPR Section II, Part 5. Only those builders
submitting acceptable technical proposals in part one are
requested to submit priced proposals in response to a formal
IFB in part two of the procedure. As previously mentioned, the
procurement was then restricted to small business.
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The step one RFP was issued to fourteen yards on 22 June
1971 with proposals due on 24 August 1971. Unfortunately,
only three proposals were received. Two of them were deemed
clearly unacceptable and the third was considered amenable to
being made acceptable. ASPR 3-210.3 places a restriction on
negotiating with the only successful technical proposer in
a two-step Small Business Restricted Advertising procurement.
It was therefore necessary to cancel the RFP and reissue it
without the small business set-aside.
The initial lack of response to the RFP was disappointing,
and added response was considered unlikely by opening the
procurement to large business. PMS-391 had requested that the
bidders list be restricted to those yards that were experienced
0S3 builders, however, a few other yards requested that they
be added to the list. The two unsuccessful proposers were
northeast U.S. yards tiiat had not built 0S3s before. PMS-391
attributed the lack of response to a combination of backlogs,
steady customer considerations, unwillingness to spend money
for proposal preparation and 1 as t-mi nu te deci sions not to get
involved with the :Javy.
The evaluation of the unpriced technical proposals was
performed by a team composed of several engineers from PMS-391 ,
iJAVSEC and a few select engi neer/oceanographers from the
oceanographi c community. A scoring system was developed based
on degree of conformance with the COR and past experience in





Technical Proposal Evaluation Scoring System
II
III
Construction of Supply or Exploration Vessel
(Show evidence of)
Hul 1 and Structure
A. Less than 300 gross tons 2 1/2%
B. Conformance to ABS standards 2 1/2%
C. Fire fighting/Life Saving 5 %
D. Access and arrangements 10 %
Machinery
A. Controls/Alarms 5 %
B. Arrangements/Maintainability 12 1/2%
C. Pilothouse/Unmanned Engine Room 3 1/2%
D. Spares 2 %
E. Tests and Trials 2 %
Payl o ad/ Mission
A. Bolt Downs/Deck weight capacity 2 1/2%





















The two unsuccessful proposers received ratings of 67.5
and 62.5, while the one successful proposer received a 96.
The two losers scored low because they did not in fact modify
an OSB design according to the guidelines in the COR. Their
proposals were essentially a regurgitation of the COR and
could not be used as a specification for step two. The fact
that neither of the two had experience in building OSBs
showed in their proposals. All three proposers were notified
of the results of the evaluation and the cancellation and
projected reissuance of the RFP. All three were given detailed
statements of the deficiencies in their proposals.
PMS-391 next issued a modification to its procurement
request adding several large builders to the bidders list.
The RFP was then reissued on 4 November 1971. Only two pro-
posals were received on 4 January 1972; one from Halter Marine
Services, New Orleans, the previous successful proposer, and
one from General Ship and Engine Works of East Boston, Mass.,
a previous unsuccessful proposer. The other unsuccessful
proposer dropped out. Proposal evaluation was completed on
4 February 19 72 with Halter Marine again receiving a 96 and
General Ship a 79 this time due to the correction of many of
the deficiencies cited to them. Both proposals were considered
amenable to being made acceptable, and both proposers were
advised of desired changes to their proposals. Both proposers
agreed to the changes proposed by NAVSHIPS and on 29 March 1972
the IFB was issued; each builder bidding on his own specification
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Halter Marine and General Ship submitted bids for two ships
as follows:
Hal ter Mari ne General Ship
$3,783,000 $4,903,042
The Halter Marine bid was well within the budget ($4,334,000
for two ships) and PMS-391's internal cost estimates. The
.NAVSHIPS cost-estimating branch did not make an estimate be-
cause of the commercial nature of the vessels. The IFB called
for delivery of the ships fourteen and fifteen months after
date of award.
Since Halter Marine's bid was low and their technical
score high, PMS-391 had little reservation about the award.
The required pre-award survey was conducted in May 1972.
Halter Marine was deemed responsible without reservation as a
result of the survey, and after a review by a NAVSHIPS Contract
Evaluation Panel, award of contract M00024-72-C-0288 was made
on 23 June 1972. 0CEANAV assigned the first ship to Texas
ASM University and the second to the University of Hawaii. The
Government was to accept the .vessels at the contractor's yard
and then move them to the Texas A&M Marine Facility at Galveston,
Texas for outfitting and installation of pay load.
Exhibit 4 is a schedule of the major events in the acquis-
ition process up to the time of contract award. Obviously,
there are several significant delays. Some of the delay can
be attributed to the unique nature of the program, but most
is due the low priority of the program and characteristic slow-




Schedule of Major Events








6. RFP(unpriced technical) issued-step one
(small business set-aside required)
7. Revised RFP(unpriced technical) issued
8. Proposals opened
9. Proposal Evaluation Completed
10. IFB issued-step two
11. Bids opened













12 May 19 72
23 June 1972
*The delay between events 3 and 4 was due largely to a






The term Contract Management as used herein includes
contract administration as performed by DoD field contract
administration activities as well as the management efforts
of the project office staff and user institutions.
PMS-391 discovered sometime before contract award that the
Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding Office for the Eighth Naval
District in New Orleans did not have plant cognizance over
Halter Marine Services. Rather, Halter Marine was covered by
the Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) as are all
plants not otherwise assigned to one of the Services. This
presented a problem in the DCAS, in particular the DCAS office
in Houston, Texas, was an unknown quantity. PMS-391 learned
that DCASO Houston provided Quality Assurance services on
numerous boat contracts in Louisiana and Texas, but that ACO
functions were usually handled by the procuring office.
PMS-391 in fact wanted ACO services, but not QA services. It
had always been their intent to have most of the field admin-
istration functions performed by their RPO. The problem was
one of shielding the contractor from the red-tape and close
supervision associated with both DCAS and SUPSHIP administra-
tion. Many "normal" Government contract administration
practices were seen as potentially harmful to the relationship




SUPSHIP procedures were well understood by PMS-391 and
prior to DCAS entering the picture, in fact as early as 1970,
they had been negotiating within NAVSHIPS for a modified con-
tract administration structure that would compliment the
commercial acquisition concept. In a 22 July 1970 memo to
NAVSHIPS 07, then the organizational element responsible for
field inspection procedures, PMS-391 proposed that the RPO
be responsible directly to NAVSHIPS, have Contracting Officer
Representative designation and not be organizationally linked
to the cognizant SUPSHIP. The RPO was to have an assistant
from one of the user institutions and technical representative
assistance as needed. PMS-391 's memo was quite detailed in its
description of the commercial standards and practices to be
employed and the probable ramifications should normal Navy
procedures be followed. Specifically, PMS-391 forewarned of
(1) some builders electing not to bid, (2) higher bids due to
projected administrative expenses and uncertainty, and (3)
prolonged construction periods caused by builders having to
become acclimated to Navy procedures. Additionally, it was
pointed out that MARAD did not even station personnel in the
builder's yard during the FERREL acquisition, and that ship
was delivered early at the original contract price. PMS-391
also pointed out that OCEANAV had agreed to fund the entire
RPO function. NAVSHIPS 07 maintained in their reply that the
AGOR (U) contract could easily be administered by a SUPSHIP
without significant deviation from existing NAVSHIPS regulations
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The did, however, propose an alternative wherein the RPO
would be designated a Resident SUPSHIP (RESUPSHIP) under
SUPSHIP administrative control, but would report directly to
PMS-391 on project matters. PMS-391 considered this alternative
acceptable and a proposed organization chart and list of duties,
EXHIBIT 5, were drawn up for formal concurrence within NAVSHIPS.
When it was learned that DCAS had cognizance over Halter
Marine Services, PMS-391 was presented with new alternatives.
They could (1) initiate action to have plant cognizance
transferred to SUPSHIP ."Jew Orleans, (2) accept DCAS administra-
tion or (3), as proposed earlier by NAVSHIPS 07, request DCAS
to allow SUPSHIP personnel to assume most contract adminis-
tration functions because of their expertise in the ship-
building field. Alternative (3) had been used previously in
yards holding Navy Master Ship Repair contracts and not engaged
in work under DCAS cognizance at the time.
PMS-391 was in contact with DCASO Houston during this time.
A post-award conference was arranged and carried out and DCAS
personnel were acquainted with the project and PHS-391's desire
to work primarily through the RPO. In the interim PMS-391
became satisfied that administration with DCAS assistance would
be acceptable. They therefore elected not to request SUPSHIP
involvement. DCASO Houston agreed to provide only those
services requested by PMS-391 and to avoid unneeded surveil-
lance visits to the contractor's facility. NAVSHIPS' dele-


















Duties of Resident Project. Officer (RPO )
1. Report completion of milestones for PMS-391 verification.
2. Review plans, other documents and work performance for
conformance to Contractor perpared specifications.
3. Refer need for contract changes to PMS-391 /Con tracti ng
Officer.
4. Maintain liaison with PMS-391 and provide periodic progress
reports .
5. Phase- in nucleus crew.
6. Monitor participation by Regulatory Bodies.
7. Control User payload acquisition and interfacing.
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the practices agreed to in a DCASO/PMS-391 meeting, stated
that DCASO would provide an Administrative Contracting Officer
(ACO) to assist PMS-391 and the RPO in processing milestone
payments and reduced cost/no cost/administrative changes to
the contract. Increase cost changes could be delegated to the
ACO on a case basis, which in fact they were.
DCASO Houston had considerable experience with limited
delegations of authority and the principal elements of DCASO
and its regional command, DCASR Dallas, adapted readily to the
situation. PMS-391 and DCASO Houston signed a Memorandum of
Agreement in October 1972 which defined the interface between
the RPO and the DCAS organization. The RPO was established as
the single point of contact between the Government and the
contractor and the sole representative on technical and inspec
tion matters. DCASO was to handle strictly contractual and
financial matters. In retrospect this arrangement worked
yery well, but it was necessary for the ACO to fend off
attempts from lower management levels within the DCAS organ-
ization to restrict his flexibility. DCASR and DCASO top
management viewed their participation in the program with
pride since they had never before administered a Navy ship-
building contract. But at the same time there was some
suspicion of the soundness of the procedures being used by
PMS-391 among lower level DCAS management. The fact that
DCASO Houston was being asked to insulate Halter Marine from
some of the standard reviews was seen as coddling the
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contractor at the expense of sound contract administration
practice. Most of the suspicion was due to lack of under-
standing or acceptance of the commercial acquisition concept
being used.
The fact that the ACO assigned by DCASO Houston was a
Naval Officer with previous SUPSHIP experience, and that
another Naval Officer assumed the DCASO Chief job, minimized
problems from within DCAS. The RPO and the ACO established
a sound working relationship, communicated frequently and
made no attempt to interfere with the other's areas of
responsibility. The DCASO Chief contributed by authorizing
sufficient travel funds to permit the ACO to visit Halter
Marine frequently, by providing frequent status reports to
the DCASR Dallas Region Commander and publicizing the project
nationally within DCAS. DCAS was represented by Flag Officers
at the christening ceremonies for the ships as a result of
these efforts. The RPO and PMS-391 staff also excelled at
publicizing the project and undoubtedly maintained support
through this type of effort. PMS-391 considered this aspect
to be an important part of their management effort.
PMS-391 had several goals for the contract management team.
One of the highly important goals that was exceeded was that
of paying the contractor as quickly as his commercial customers
The RPO/ACO/PMS-391 team assembled for each milestone; tech-
nical approval was made, and the invoices were approved and
immediately forwarded for payment by the ACO. The payment was
52

usually received in less than ten days. This promptness drew
considerable praise from the contractor since he had expected
the Government to be \/ery slow in this respect.
Processing of contract modifications was handled in a
similar manner. Some modifications were issued on-site and
those not priced before issuance were definitized promptly.
Procurement regulations made it impossible to duplicate the
informal, often verbal, change order procedure used by
commercial owner's representatives, but the promptness realized
was a great improvement over that normally found on Navy ship-
building contracts, large or small.
The above mentioned three member team managed most aspects
of the contract. Each member mobilized the resources of his
parent organization as needed. The RPO, in addition to reporting
status tc his formal superior, OCEANAV, also frequently briefed
the user institutions. This particular team structure was not
planned in advance, but evolved as dictated by circumstances
and organizational politics. The number of personnel involved
on a daily basis was kept to a minimum in order to avoid over-
whelming the contractor or generating commensurate administra-
tive expense on his part. It should also be noted that all
three of the people involved were assigned other duties in
addition to the AGOR project. The RPO responded to tasks from
OCEANAV and traveled frequently to assess the progress on pay-
load equipment contracts. The ACO carried a full workload
responding to 75 contractors other than Halter Marine. The
PMS-391 Assistant Project Manager for Oceanographi c Ships
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managed the payload procurement for these ships as well as
several other ship acquisition programs plus advance design
projects for additional ship programs. The intent was to run
a barebones, cost-effective effort in keeping with commercial
practice.
E. ACCEPTANCE TRIALS
One of the steps that must be accomplished in any Navy
shipbuilding program is an Acceptance Trial (AT) under the
supervision of the Navy's 3oard of Inspection and Survey
(INSURV). Even though AGOR-21 and 22 were being built to
commercial standards, PMS-391 made no attempt to challenge
the imposition of a full scale INSURV trial.
AGOR-21 and 22, as previously mentioned, were to be built
to American Bureau of Shipping and U.S. Coast Guard standards.
ABS, USCG and the other regulatory bodies normally witness
tests throughout the ship construction process and do not base
their approval on one underway trial. INSURV, on the other
hand, conducts a two trial procedure during which they inspect
for conformance to Navy regulations, specifications, instructions
and the SCB Characteristics. The President of the INSURV
Board is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and recommends
whether or not a ship should be accepted for service use.
PMS-391 correctly surmised that the INSURV Board would have
difficulty adapting to commercial standards. Although AGOR-21
had received ABS classification and certification by the other
regulatory bodies, INSURV could not be expected to automatically
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approve the ship. PMS-391 staff members briefed the INSURV
Board in advance of the trial regarding the commercial standards,
the mission of the ship and its characteristics. The unique
provision of the contract which required correction of all
deficiencies incident to each payment milestone completion was
emphasized, also. INSURV, however, found sufficient fault
with AGOR-21 to require a limited retrial. Much of the problem
resulted from the contractor's lack of understanding of the
very structured, formal nature of an INSURV trial. INSURV
expects all the finishing touches to be put on a ship whereas
commercial customers check only functional type items at time
of acceptance trials. INSURV's inspection was generally much
more thorough than that of a commercial owner and, despite
warnings to that effect from PMS-391, Halter Marine was not
thoroughly prepared. Once these differences in practice were
ironed-out, the AGOR-21 retrial went smoothly. A modified
trial procedure was used for AGOR-22 with a greatly reduced
scope and level of effort. INSURV reported less than one
third the number of trial deficiencies for AGOR-22 as they did
for AGOR-21. Considering the large gap in methods and standards
between INSURV and Halter Marine, the ordeal, a "first" for
both parties, was probably unavoidable.
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F. THE CONTRACTOR'S VIEWPOINT
Halter Marine personnel were involved in some earlier
oceanographi c ship design work for the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography. They were, and are today, interested in further
adaptation of the 0S3 design. They were, however, leery of
Government contracts despite their enthusiasm for the Navy's
interest in using the OSB for an oceanographi c research plat-
form.
Their concerns regarding Government contracts centered
on two areas: (1) "red-tape" and (2) financing. "Red-tape"
to them means excessive paperwork, overi nspection , audits,
EEO reviews and the general slow response characteristic of a
Government agency. Financially, they felt that the lack of a
down payment, anticipated payment lag, the uncertainty of
renegotiation and possible unallowable costs all drove up
their risk. They also cited the problems involved in the
highly publicized Litton claim against the Navy as another
deterrent to doing business with the Government.
Halter Marine's sales in 1972 were about $18 million with
a net before taxes of about $2 million. Sales now approach
$70 million with a net before taxes of about $10 million.
This indicates the growing nature of their business and in a
way explains their involvement with the AGOR project. During
a lull in their business in 1972 they bid on the AGOR contract
to fill some of their expanded capacity that was then unused.
Their previous involvement in oceanograph i c ship design vari-
ations was also a factor.
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Their bid breakdown showed a profit margin of six percent.
Their usual expected margin is in the fifteen to twenty per-
cent range. Part of the reason for the low profit bid figure
was a mistaken belief by their management that any profit above
the level they bid would be declared "excessive" and recouped
by the Renegotiation Board. The view was firmly held despite
repeated assurance to the contrary by the ACO and PMS-391 .
They used an inordinately low profit percentage on all change
order proposals throughout the contract life. This, fortu-
nately, offset an unallowable portion of their G&A rate which
they refused to delete.
Due to the lack of a down payment they committed $500,000
of their own capital to purchase materials needed early in the
construction process. They were also required to obtain a
performance bond and found it difficult to establish a line of
credit with a bonding company, since this is not a requirement
of their commercial customers, and no bonding company was
familiar with their finances.
There was considerable tension over the subject of audits.
They were unaware of the extent to which they could be audited,
even under a competitively awarded FFP contract. Initially,
an accounting system review for progress (milestone) payments
was required. Later an audit to verify their proposed labor
3 Profit is in fact limited to 10% of contract price for all
shipbuilding contracts by the Vi nson-Trammel 1 Act(10 USC 2382
and 7300) which was invoked in the contract general provisions
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and overhead rates for change order pricing was performed.
Finally, a P.L. 87-653 cost/pricing data audit was accomplished
for one large change order over $100,000 gross value. All of
these audits were agreed to grudgingly and only after lengthy
explanation of the contractual provisions authorizing them.
Other contractual provisions were also of some concern
to them. The Liquidated Damages provision was considered
abnormal and they feared a strict Government interpretation
regarding "Acts of God" causing delays in construction. As it
turned out, the effects of two hurricanes were felt in the area
and their yard was flooded causing some delay, which, although
settled favorably, required a great deal of effort to justify
to NAVSH I PS Legal Counsel. They were assessed damages ($25,500)
for 1 ate deliveries.
They considered the EE0 clause enforcement by the Federal
Office of Contracts Compliance (0CC) to be more onerous than
State requirements and a duplication thereof. The INSURV
trials problems were unanticipated, as previously mentioned,
but the extra cost experienced was covered by an overly hig'h
bid element for inspection costs. This extra inspection cost
in their bid reflected their concern about the local DCAS QA
specialist and the SUPSHIP New Orleans QA department. Asked
to rate the AG0R 21 and 22 contract level of inspection, they
stated that it was about five on a one to ten scale. Their
one previous Government contract experience was on a Corps of
Engineers workboat over which DCAS exercised inspection
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responsibility. This was ten on their scale with zero being
their least obtrusive commercial customer.
On balance they were pleased with the AGOR contract and,
except for the audit and IiNSURV problems, experienced fewer
problems than anticipated. They claimed to have made over
seven percent profit on the contract, but this figure doesn't
take into account the opportunity cost of using their own
capital for the large, initial material purchases necessiated
by the lack of a down payment customary in commercial business.
They have since bid on other procurements for Navy ships
based on the OSB design. Discussion of their bids will be
included in a later chapter.
G. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
Appendix B is the contract performance summary prepared
by the NAVSHIPS PCO after final settlement of the AGOR-21/22
contract. Several items are noteworthy, the most obvious
being the assessment of liquidated damages totaling $25,500.00.
AG0R-21 was three days late and AGOR-22 was forty-eight days
late. Nothing was assessed with regard to the 300 gross ton
limitation since it was not exceeded. The 1100 ton figure in
part 3c of the report refers to displacement tonnage, not gross
tonnage. Item 4e (Mod A00032), a $20,944.11 reduction, refers
to costs incurred by the Navy in correcting deficiences found
during acceptance trials or the year long guaranty period.
Final acceptance of ships is not made until the end of the
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guaranty period. Items 4g and 4h refer to consumables and
spare parts commercially procured by the contractor. It was
decided during the course of the contract to use the contractor
as a central purchasing office to buy the many line items
needed instead of having each user institution purchase them
separately with Navy funds.
The only really unsatisfactory aspect in the report is the
lateness of AGOR-22, but, as stated earlier, the Navy was not
greatly concerned about the delivery schedule. The trial item
deficiency figure (4e) is well within acceptable limts.
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IV. VESSEL OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
A. OPERATING COSTS
Considerable subjective information regarding AGOR 21
and 22 operational performance was obtained from Texas A&M
University and the University of Hawaii. As for an objective
comparison with similar size ships, it was informative to
refer to a study done by Commander W. C. Knodle, USN , who is
presently assigned to the OCEANAV staff.
Knodle classified oceanographi c and hydrographic ships
into four size categories and compared, thei r operating costs'
in an effort to identify cost reduction possibilities. R/V
GYRE (AGOR-21) operated by Texas A&M, and R/V MOANA (AGOR-22)
operated by Hawaii, were classified in the "intermediate" size
category, which ranges from 652 to 950 tons displacement.
GYRE and MOANA WAVE both displace 950 tons. Seven other ships
were in the intermediate category. Knodle used the following
eight comparison factors in his evaluation:
1 . Total costs (of operation)
2. Total costs less maintenance costs
3. Total cost per day at sea
4. Total cost less maintenance cost per day at sea
5. Crew costs
6. Maintenance costs
7. Fuel cost per day at sea
8. Fuel consumption at cruising speed
Knodle concluded that GYRE and MOANA WAVE appeared to have some
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advantage in operating costs. One factor contributing to this
advantage was the smaller crew size needed, due to admeasuring
under 300 gross tons and automation, despite being the
largest vessels in the intermediate category. He did note
that maintenance costs for GYRE and MOA'IA WAVE were less
because they were newer than the other seven ships. Once
maintenance costs were removed, GYRE and MOANA WAVE had a
reduced but measurable advantage.
In his final recommendations, Knodle stated that potential
savings exist through replacement of AGOR-3 Class ships,
which displace over 1,3 00 tons, with AGO R- 21 Class ships.
He concluded that due to the inherent flexibility of the
AGOR-21 Class design, they could undertake missions normally
performed by the larger AGOR-3 Class ships at a forty to fifty
percent savings in operating costs.
B. SEAKINDLINESS
There are subjective factors that weigh as heavily as
operating costs, especially in the minds of the people who
go to sea on AGORs. Seakindl i ness is one of these factors.
How well the ship rides is very important in evaluating its
efficiency. A ship may be rugged and reliable, but ride so
poorly that the people who sail on it find it very difficult
to operate their equipment. If the ship cannot handle heavy
weather, they may be forced to abandon their operating area
when a more stable snip could remain on station.
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Texas A&i'l and Hawaii rated GYRE and MOANA WAVE very highly
in seakindl iness . Texas A&I1 has been operating GYRE at a rate
of about 300 days per year and has found the hull design to be
sound in all types of weather. Hawaii operated MOANA WAVE
slightly more than half as much as GYRE was operated in CY
1977. Their opinion as regards seakindl iness is essentially
the same as Texas A&M's. Based on subjective evidence, it
appears that the current, all-oceans OSB design has fulfilled
expectations as an oceanographi c research platform.
C. RELIABILITY AND MAINTENANCE
The AGOR 21/22 contract contained no specific reliability
requirements. Rather, PMS-391 relied upon commercial standards
and the proven reputation of the OSB industry to provide a
reliable vessel. In this respect one vessel operator has been
disappointed. Texas A&M reported significant problems in
several areas; the major one being the propulsion system.
AGOR 21 and 22 are twin screw vessels equipped with Caterpillar
diesel engines and a controllable pitch propulsion system
manufactured in Norway. AGOR 21 and 22 were two of the first
OSB type vessels to have a controllable pitch propulsion
system. Texas A&M's ship, R/V GYRE, had a bad shaft alignment
and other problems with tiie propulsion system that persisted
after the one year guaranty period expired. These problems
cost Texas A&M over $250,000 to correct over a period of
several years. Additionally, Texas A&M reported that the
ship's air-conditioning system is of poor design and requires
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too much maintenance. They have replaced valves, piping
wiring and almost all hydraulic tubing because of failures
which they attribute to installation of inferior quality
materials by the builder. They feel these problems have
driven their maintenance costs up disproportionately. Their
CY 1977 maintenance cost was $175,000 which includes $60,000
for propulsion system repairs.
The University of Hawaii on the other hand, reported no
disproportionate maintenance expenses and did not experience
propulsion system or air-conditioning problems. Mor did they
mention any wiring, or hydraulic problems; only a problem
with the durability of some plastic air control piping in the
engine room was indicated. Some minor construction/ instal 1 ation
defects were reported, but their number and seriousness was
not considered to be inordinate for a new ship. Overall,
Hawaii considers M0ANA WAVE to be a reliable and well-built
vessel. Their CY 1977 maintenance cost was $116,000 of which
$60,000 was for a periodic overhaul.
Some of the variance in Texas A&M's and Hawaii's maintenance/
reliability experiences can be attributed to the difference in
tempo of operations. Certainly, the degree of preventative
maintenance is also a factor. Undoubtedly though, there were
some problems, such as the bad shaft alignment, which were
caused by the builder and were overcome on the second vessel,
the M0AMA WAVE. Texas A&M was perhaps less fortunate than
Hawaii in receiving the first of the two ships, as well as




Texas A&M reported that the bolt-down fitting feature
provided less flexibility than expected. They are now instal-
ling some vans/equipment on a more permanent basis in lieu of
bolting them down. The primary problem is that of service
(electric power, water and air lines) to the vans/equipments.
The service lines are exposed on the open, working decks, and,
as a result, take considerable abuse often resulting in a
safety hazard. Texas A&M is protecting these lines with
permanent housings which might have to be torn out if the
van/equipment configuration were changed greatly.
Hawaii has not experienced the same problem, possibly due
to a difference in operational tasks. MOANA WAVE has been used
recently on a Navy project which required significant equipment






In 1975 PMS-391 was disestablished and its functions were
absorbed by PMS-333, the project office for all auxiliary,
amphibious and special mission ships. PMS-383 has several
projects under its cognizance which use or envision using a
modified 0S3 or other stock commercial hull as the basic
platform. PMS-383, like PilS-391, is attempting to use com-
mercial standards and attract OSB builders to their procurements
Two of the PMS-383 projects will be described and contrasted
with the AGOR-21/22 acquisition in the following paragraphs.
B. FLEET TUG, T-ATF-166, CLASS PROGRAM
1 . Mission need
The T-ATF is intended to replace the Navy's fleet of
22 World War II class fleet tugs, all of which are over 28
years old. The T-ATF 166 Class will be mult i -miss ion vessels
capable of performing the following functions:
Towing at sea
Rescue and limited salvage at sea with pro table equip-
ment
Limited Diving with portable equipment
Extinguishing fires on ships in distress at sea
Limited Self-defense
Open sea oil-spill pollution abatement
The primary missions of towing, dewatering and firefighting
will be accomplished by the Military Seal i ft Command (MSC)
civilian crew embarked full time. Other missions will be
accomplished with the assistance of transient military
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diving and salvage personnel specially trained and equipped with
portable equipment for the particular mission.
2 . Programming
A preliminary design for a Navy manned, Navy speci-
fication ATF was approved by CNO in 1973. This ATF was
included in the FY 1975 Navy shipbuilding program budget
request, but was deleted by DoD. In a successful reclama to
that decision, the Navy proposed a commercial standard vessel
as an alternative. The commercial version was designated
T-ATF after the OPNAV sponsor decided to have MSC operate the
ships with civilian crews. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
authorized one ship in the FY 1975 program and three in FY 1976.
In preparing its position for the aforementioned reclama,
the Navy evaluated four different ATF profiles. Exhibit 6
outlines the results of that evaluation. NAVSEA strongly
endorsed alternative 4. Their position was that for a com-
mercially built, Navy-manned ship program to be successful,
it was essential that a clear definition of the technical
aspects of the program be established and held inviolable.
In the absence of this, a commercially built ship for Navy
manning would be subject to "creeping militarization" as the
acquisition process proceeded. [9] Because of the plethora
of potential problems in areas such as habitability and train-
ing, and the cost estimates, OPNAV opted for a commercial ship
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PMS-383 developed a T-ATF-166 Class COR similar to
the AGOR-21 Class COR, but less specific in nature. The COR
describes a basic offshore tug/supply vessel design built to
commercial standards as was AGOR-21/22. In many respects the
OSB was even more suitable to be a T-ATF than it was to be an
AGOR, since in the 1970's OSB designers and builders were
world leaders in development of large all-oceans tug, rescue
and supply vessels. The COR encompasses all of the CNO char-
acteristics which were approved on 28 August 1973. The T-ATFs
will be considerably larger than AGOR-21/22 reflecting their
mission requirement. In the commercial environment OSBs have
evolved into increasingly larger sizes, so the ?Javy was not
asking for a blown-up AGOR-21, but rather a vessel similar to
commercially available tug/supply boats.
The ship will be configured for a sixteen man civilian
crew and a four-man Navy communications team. The habitability
requirements represent MSC standards, which are somewhat more
luxurious than non-union commercial supply boat standards.
There will be troop type accomodations for twenty transients.
The Navy communications equipment will be installed after
delivery of the ships.
4 Acquisition strategy
The T-ATF-166 Class program follows basically the same
acquisition strategy employed for the AGOR-21 Class program.
The two-step formal advertising procedure was used for the
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initial four-ship buy. The builders were sent preliminary
inquiries, but only three acceptable technical proposals were
received, and only one of the three submitted a responsive bid
in step two. A small business set-aside was not used on order
to avoid the problem encountered on the AGOR-21/22 procurement.
A contract was awarded to the sole responsive bidder,
Marinette Marine Corp., Marinette, Wise. The contract price
for each of the four vessels is $7.6 million. The first
vessel is approximately forty percent complete at the time of
this writing.
A second lot of three ships is now in the bidding
stage. This second lot was solicited on the basis of the
specification developed by Marinette Marine in step one of the
initial procurement, therefore, the two-step procedure was
not used. There were four responsive bidders for lot two with
Marinette Marine as low and Halter Marine high. Halter Marine
was the only one of the traditional OSB builders to bid. The
ilavy is fortunate to have attracted the small builders on the
Great Lakes to these acquisitions; they did not bid on the
AGOR-21/22 procurement.
An effort was made to visit several OSB builders, as
was done for the AGOR program, to stir interest in the
T-ATF-166 program, however, none of the yards visited except
Halter Marine bid. It appears that OSB builders will remain
reluctant to forsake their commercial customers for Navy work
despite the use of commercial standards and practices. As long
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as the search for oil remains intense, these builders will
have a backlog of work. Halter Marine, now the largest 0S3
builder with six separate yards, apparently still has the
capacity to entertain Navy work. It was noted, however, that
Halter Marine's labor rates have escalated and are considerably
higher than Great Lakes shipyard rates. The labor rate dif-
ferential accounts for much of the difference in bids for
T-ATF-166. How well Halter Marine's rates reflect the Gulf
Coast shipyard labor market is unknown, but Halter has
historically paid top wages in the area, though not a union
yard. They consider this a necessity to attract and maintain
a competent, stable labor force.
5 . Contract provision changes
Differences between the AGOR-21/22 and the T-ATF
contracts were slight. The NPD changes clause was dropped and
replaced with the standard ASPR 7-103.2 Changes clause. The
ASPR 7-104.86 Notification of Changes clause was added
providing coverage with regard to Contracting Officer Repre-
sentatives and constructive change orders. A new milestone
payments clause was used which contains the language of the
standard MAVSEA progress payments clause and incorporates the
milestones. The milestones themselves were changed for T-ATF
and are now as shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3. T-ATF Milestone Payment Schedule
.'ULESTOiME (Per Vessel )
(1) Placement of purchase order for 30%
of dollar value of material
(2) Placement of purchase orders for a
total of 70% of dollar value of material
(3) Keel laying
(4) Receipt of 30% of dollar value of material
(5) Receipt of a total of 60% of dollar value
of material
(6) Completion of hull structure up to and
including the main deck, framing, plating,
stiffening and welding
(7) All hull structure including superstructure
and stacks completion
(8) Electrical installation completion
(9) All joiner work completion
(10) Dock trials
(11) Successful completion of Acceptance Trials
(12) Delivery of ship to government
(13) Completion of delivery of all data for the

















It should be noted that milestones (1), (2) and (4)
provide payment based on material orders/receipts unlike the
AGOR-21/22 clause. This change provides more money earlier
thus alleviating financing problem for the small builders.
A Liquidated Damages provision, mechanically the same
as for AGOR-21/22, was used with the monetary amounts increased
by fifty percent. No other si gn i fi can t' changes in contract
content were noted indicating that the Contracts/Legal people
have made a permanent adjustment to PMS-383's methodology.
6 . Contract Management
PMS-383 was unable to replicate the contract management
arrangement used for AGOR-21/22. MSC, the vessel operator, was
requested to assign an on-site representative, as they do when
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one of their ships undergoes a shipyard overhaul. The nego-
tiation with riSC was not successful, however, and PMS-383 fell
back on the cognizant SUPSHIP at Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin to
provide a representative in the yard. DCAS was not involved
in this program since Marinette Marine has been a builder of
small Naval vessels for many years and the Navy, therefore,
has always had plant cognizance. A comprehensive Memorandum
of Agreement was developed by PMS-383 and SUPSHIP Sturgeon Bay
delineating the responsibilities of each party and setting out
in detail the functions to be performed by the on-site
representative at Marinette Marine. The SUPSHIP assigned
their Quality Assurance man at Marinette to act as the on-site
representative, the focal point for the Navy in its relations
with the contractor. This arrangement resembles the RESUPSHIP
alternative proposed by NAVSHIPS 07 for the AG0R-21 project.
The on-site representative is an employee of the contract
administration office instead of the project office or user
organization in this case. The degree of engineering sur-
veillance will not be the same, but Marinette Marine is an
experienced Navy contractor. PMS-383 is relying more heavily




INSURV participation will be patterned after the AGOR-22
AT. Relatively few INSURV board members are expected to witness
the builder's own underway trial and the actual AT. PMS-383
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has planned on the basis of INSURV having adapted to commercial
standards and practices. The risk in this assumption is
lessened because Marinette Marine is familiar with INSURV
procedures, which Halter Marine was not.




The T-AGOS-1 Class mission is to collect, process and
transmit accoustic data. The ships will provide a platform for
deployment of a towed array sensor (SURTASS) being developed
by the Naval Electronics Systems Command. [10]
2 Programmi ng
The ship part of the program is tied to the SURTASS
which is in the R&D phase. An interesting sidelight is that
the prototype SURTASS system is deployed on MOANA WAVE (AG0R-22)
for tests. The first three ships are in the President's FY 79
budget. The first ship will be delivered in the fourth quarter
of FY 1981. A class of twelve ships is planned.
3 Technical Characteristics
T-AGOS-1 is to be slightly smaller than T-ATF-166,
but larger than AGOR-21/22. Propulsion will be di esel -el ectri c
vice geared diesel as in the other two classes and most standard
OSBs.
4. Acquisition Strategy
The T-AGOS sponsor in OPNAV, independent of PMS-333,
became convinced that a T-AGOS platform based on a modified
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OSB was a cost-effective alternative and sold the SURTASS
project manager on that basis. The same emphasis on commercial
standards and practices used for T-ATF-166 and AGOR-21/22
was given by the OPNAV sponsor to T-AGOS. On this program
PMS-383 placed itself in the unenviable position of devil's
advocate to the OPNAV sponsor on many T-AGOS issues because
PMS-383 has experience with adapting the commercial OSB and
has recognized that certain requirements such as ship noise
restriction and mission length result in much larger deviations
from standard OSB design than did either T-ATF-166 or AGOR-21/22
PMS-383 continues to stay with a modified OSB strategy and has
been aided by recent OSB evolutions such as introduction of
di esel -el ectri c proplusion systems for OSB commercial customers.
Therefore, PMS-383 has been able to retain the emphasis on
commercial standards and practices for T-AGOS though interest
in building these ships by much of the OSB industry is pro-
blematical considering the scope of the deviations from standard
design. In all significant respects the planning for T-AGOS-1
is the same as for T-ATF-166. Requirements from the SURTASS
project office that result in further deviation from standard
OSB design are a potential problem that PMS-383 will have to
contend with.
D. IDEAS FROM OUTSIDE
Halter Marine's Vice-President of Engineering, Mr. Sal va do re
Guar i no, presented a paper in which he proposed a large OSB
75

design variant for general Navy use. He labeled this design
ATUS, for Auxiliary Tug, Utility and Salvage vessel. Its
capabilities would include towing and salvage; research and
survey; buoy tending; mine sweeping, submersible support;
coastal patrol; USCG cutter duties; intelligence gathering;
and fisheries protection. It is noted that one OPNAV sponsor
has authorized concept design studies by PMS-383 for a sub-
marine fleet support ship based on the OSB. This fact demon-
strates that PMS-383 is, to a limited extent, already doing
what Guarino proposes. PMS-383, chartered as the project
office for all auxiliary vessels, is in a position to propose
the OSB or other standard commercial hull designs for adapta-
tion to various Navy support ship requirements.
Whether Halter Marine's entire management group is as
commited to Navy programs remains to be seen. Halter Marine
submitted an acceptable technical proposal on the T-ATF-165
Class procurement, but was not a responsive bidder in step
two. For their part, Halter Marine claimed that the T-ATF-166
package regressed away from AGOR-21/22 toward a "MILSPEC"
ship and they bid high due to the perceived uncertainty.
Price notwithstanding, they were non-responsive because they
did not submit bids for the second, third and fourth ships of
the four ship package. In the opinion of PMS-383 staff members,
Halter Marine's objections to the T-ATF-166 COR are fallacious.
PMS-383 correctly pointed out that no MILSPECs are cited and
the COR is in fact less specific than the AGOR-21/22 COR was.
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The regression toward a MILSPEC ship that Halter Marine





The oceanographi c community's interest in OSB variants
was driven primarily by cost considerations. The bureaucratic
directives now requiring consideration of commercial products,
specification tailoring and commercial business practices were
largely promulgated subsequent to the AGOR-21/22 acquisition.
Whether they will produce similar results remains to be seen,
but it is undeniable fact that the Navy would not have AGORs
21 and 22 nor a replacement fleet tug program without a
commercial acquisition strategy.
It is encouraging that DoD acquisition policymakers are
concerned; for example Mr. Jacques Gansler, former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition) wrote
recently in the Harvard Business Review that material acqui-
sition efficiency could be improved by revising military
specifications and procurement practices to make defense busi-
ness less unique and by motivating industry executives to
combine their defense and commercial product lines. He feels
that defense business practices differ too much from commercial
business practices and discourage commercially oriented com-
panies from entering the defense market. Mr. Dale W. Church,
the current Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(Acquisition Policy), also wrote of the need to reduce or
eliminate the specialized nature of military specifications
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and standards, and to accept commercial practices and products,
where feasible.
With the high-level support of executives like Mr. Church,
project managers and sponsors should be encouraged to search
for commercial equipments to meet their mission needs. These
new policies will take time to percolate down through the
bureaucracy. In the interim, project managers and others
responsible for material acquisition will find it necessary
to counter ingrained standard operating procedures and fend-
off criticism from those who have had bad experiences with
unsupportabl e commercial equipment, for example in Vietnam.
Changing business practices often requires new legislation
such as the proposed Federal Acquisition Act of 1978 now before
the Congress. As can be seen from the experiences of PMS-391
and 383, radical changes in practices will have to be made
before many segments of industry, particularly small firms,
will take defense contracts. These companies correctly per-
ceive that project managers, however well-intentioned, are
limited in the degree to which they can ameliorate practices
required by law or regulation.
Within the limits of flexibility allowed a project manager,
PMS-391 and 383 did demonstrate what can be done. What follows
is a summary of the key factors to be considered in a com-
mercial type acquisition of a major piece of equipment based




The project manager must have the power to sell an acqui-
sition strategy based on commercial standards and practices and
also to keep it from being progressively diluted. PMS-391/383
clearly and forcefully stated their intentions in this regard
in all their planning documents. They obtained the approval
of their superiors in each case.
/The project manager must use his high-level approvals to
gain concessions in order to simplify contractual packages,
waive design reviews, delete excessive data requirements and
inspections, etc. All of the various power centers within the
command or service will want to pass judgment on the program.
Care must be taken in deciding which threats can be ignored
safely and which must be addressed in order to maintain the
acquisition concept.
The commercial market to be entered should be fully under-
stood. Financing procedures, engineering practices, inspection
procedures and the like must be known. The milestone payments
provision and the User Representati ve/RPO arrangement were
successful adaptations to the OSB commercial environment.
The program may have to be sold to the segment of industry
involved. Success is this endeavor is difficult to measure,
but without the PMS-391/383 efforts even the few participants
that were attracted might not have responded.
The procurement procedure should be carefully considered.
For the two-step formal advertising procedure to be successful,
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two fundamental prerequisites are required: (1) There must
already be established a commercial marketplace with products
available, and (2) the mission need of the procuring agency
must be capable of being satisfied by the commercially available
products with little change to those products. When significant
"tailoring" or "militarization" of the commercial product is
necessary, then successful use of the procedure is jeopardized.
C. TECHNICAL FACTORS
A statement of requirements must be developed by the user
or mission sponsor. The project manager should insure that
terminology appropriate to the industry is used. The stand-
ards used in the industry must be adequate and fully understood
by all concerned. A mechanism, perferably contractual, should
be provided to settle technical disputes at a low level. For
the initial buy, contractor development of the specification
is recommended.
Supportabi 1 i ty should be carefully considered. Parts and
service availability to the user are critical factors. Some
components were specified by brand name on AGOR-21/22 for
supportabi 1 i ty reasons. Use of Government Furnished Equipment
defeats the purpose of commercial product acquisition and
should be installed after delivery of the system to the
Government.
Government approval of plans should not be required nor
should Government standard technical manuals be orderd.
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Production progress and other types of technical reporting
requirements should be avoided unless they are standard in the
industry.
D. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
A project manager needs control in this area to avoid
having his commercial atmosphere militarized by well-meaning
field contract administration personnel. It should be his
objective to have his own man or a user organization repre-
sentative in the contractor's plant. A written agreement
should be developed between the project manager and the con-
tract administration office which assigns responsibilities in
detail. The agreement should clearly establish the role of
the on-site or user representative whether he be the sole
Government contact point or a project officer reporting
administratively to the contract administration office.
Given that it is wery difficult to arrange a contracting
officer warrant for the user/on-site representative, emphasis
should be given to arranging responsive ACO services. Re-
liance on the PCO involves long delays in most large organi-
zations.
All field personnel involved, particularly the ACO, must
be indoctrinated in the commercial standards and practices to
be used. Auditors, OCC and other program specialists should
be required to arrange their visits to the contractor through
the user/on-site representative or ACO. They should thoroughly
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understand the commercial acquisition concept before making
their review. All such reviews not required by law or regu-
lation should be avoided. Some reviews required by the contract
administration organization's regulations can usually be can-
celed if the project manager insists. Overall, the number of
people involved should be minimized.
Special arrangements with the cognizant disbursing office
may be needed. The DCASR Dallas disbursing office had to be
thoroughly briefed in order to properly handle the AGOR-21/22
payments. A special, off-line procedure was created for that
contract with a specific individual assigned to handle all
Halter Marine invoices. The promptness of the payments to
Halter Marine attests to the worth of that effort.
E. TEST AND EVALUATION
Whatever form this function takes, ewery attempt should
be made to limit its scope to pertinent, mission-related
factors. Operational test and evaluation personnel can be
expected to have difficulty adjusting to commercial equipment
and practices. They should be briefed in advance on commercial
standards and practices, and the contractor should be acquainted
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It is the intention of this circular of requirements to provide
for the construction of twin screw, steel oceanographi c research
ships, patterned after offshore oil suoply or exploration
vessels of approximately 165 ft. length overall. The design
deoarts from the standard supply vessel in the following general
areas :
1. Stability and fire protection: One compartment sub-
division, at about 10 ft. draft, Rahola Criteria;
enclosed interior stairs.
2. Mull form and scantlings: i.e., finer entrance,
additional flare, longer fore body, and ABS scantlings
including class C ice strengthening.
3. Support for scientific equipment through provision of
bolt down fittings and service interfaces.
4. .Machinery: large generator capacity, support for at
sea periods up to 45 days, bow thruster
Specific requirements are listed
and attached drawings.
and shown in this Circular
These ships will perform as oceanographi c vessels in all waters
of the world, except Arctic and Antarctic ice, during all
climatic seasons.
Scientific operations will
vans and readily removable
and electronics which will
of bolt-down fittings with
ship.
be mostly conducted from portable
winches, gear handling equipment
be attached to the ship by means
interfaces to services from the
Procurement and installation of this oceanographi c equipment
termed "payload" except as specifically mentioned, will be
the responsibility of the Government and will be accomplished
after delivery of the ships to the Government. The contractor
shall understand that he has no responsibility for any items
of scientific payload with the exception of providing bolt-
down fittings and service interfaces to the ships and except
that the ship is capable of supporting the total weight of
payload and providing the services listed herein. The bolt-
down fittings and service interfaces are shown in the attached
drawings and tables.
The contractor shall produce ships generally in accordance
with his own standard vessels and standard practices, within
the limitations of specific materials, features and practices
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enumerated and illustrated in the attached tables and drawings,








The listing of specific terms, systems, features, components,
and categories of the design or indicating them on the attached





Check the design and/or item, system, components,
feature for adequacy and appropriate regulatory body
requi rements .
n ,. -,_.j .. w. «. . . -: j •>Procure and provide
Ins tal 1
.
Test for satisfactory opera
regulatory requirements
Guarantee in accordance w
tion and conformity to
i th the contract.
Where items, systems, features, components, or categories are
not specifically mentioned or are not shown on the drawings,
yet are necessary for:
1. Proper functioning of the vessel.
2. Meeting good commercial marine practice.
3. Meeting the requirements of the regulatory bodies as
appropri ate
.
It is to be clearly understood that the contractor shall :
1. Check the design and/or item, system, component, feature
for conformity to the above criteria.
2. Procure and nrovide.
3. Install.
4. Test for satisfactory operation and conformity to
regulatory requirements as appropriate.
5. Guarantee in accordance with the contract.
In general, equivalents proposed by the contractor for vendors'
items may be considered by the Government, and may be substi-
tuted on a specific item basis. In order for the proposed




Possess appropriate regulatory body aoproval where
requi red.
Possess similar dimensions, weights, power, service,
material and maintenance features to the item named
except where lesser dimensions and weights and superior
power, service, material and maintenance characteristics
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are not only demonstrable but are to the advantage
of the vessel's mission.
Final approval of proposed equivalents shall be by





Regulatory Body - U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) ,
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS),
U.S. Public Health Service, Federal
Communications Commission and
agencies and organizations authorized
by the above to act in their behalf
or codes cited as authority by the
above. The term "regulatory body"
or any of the agencies or organi-
zations so named are not synonymous




Mission of an Oceano -
graphic Research Vessel -
The end products to be developed by
the Contractor from this Circular
of Requirements.
An order and accompanying descriptive
specification furnished by the Con-
tractor to a vendor or subcontractor
for material and services to be
rendered in construction of these
ships.
Drawing, plan or data developed by
vendor or subcontractor illustrating
features of material and/or services
for use in construction of these ships
To provide a vehicle for facilitating
acquisition of scientific data and
samples from and in any navigable
waters of the world. To accomplish
this mission, such a vessel must
possess adecuate stability, life-
saving and fire protection, adequate
structural efficiency, competent
crew and attendant facilities to
make competence possible, recognition
of scientific demands on ships services
and inherently dangerous operations
to be performed. Also, to perform
this mission, the vessel must possess
appropriate documents for unhampered






Vendor product of commercial grade
or contractor manufactured product
of commercial grade suitable for
service under this Circular of
Requi rements .
Payl oad - Oceanographi c equipment, either
portable or readily removable,
such as vans, winches and gear
handling equipment, scientific
electronics. This equipment is
attached to the ship by means of
bolt-down fittings (exterior and
interior) and is interfaced with the
ship by means of service connections
The contractor is not responsible
for the acquisition or installation
of pay load except as specifically




Written procedure for testing by
contractor of a system in or compo-
nent of the ship.
Shipyard or shipbuilder party to





CERTIFICATION & OTHER REQUIREMENTS*
A. Materials and Certification
1. All materials and articles installed in the ships shall
be new and of the best commercial marine quality.
2. Construction of the ships under special survey of the
American Bureau of Shipping to the classification Al
E#AMS with Class C Ice Strengthening.
U. S. Coast Guard
(Subchapter C)
Rules and Regulations for Uninspected Vessels
U. S. Public Health Service certificate of sanitary ship con-
struction for vessels on foreign voyages--i nstal 1 ation of
water, plumbing, food preparation systems and ratproofing in
accordance with USPHS handbook on Sanitation of Vessel Con-
struction .
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standards No. 45 for electfical components and installations.
Federal Communications Commission Requirements.
Panama and Suez Canal Regulations.
International Load Line Regulations 1966.
Motorboat registration numbers for the specific state of each
ship user, under the Federal Boating Act of 1958. (States of
Texas and Hawaii apply.)
3. Under the terms of Public Law 89-99 (1965) an ocean-
ographic research vessel is not engaged in trade or
commerce; therefore the ships defined in this circular
of requirements will not be registered, enrolled or
licensed with the U.S. Bureau of Customs and are thus
undocumented, numbered ships. Accordingly, these
ships are exempt from the provision of the 1960 Inter-
national Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS
60).
4. It is the intent of this Circular of Requirements that
the ships as produced by the contractor at and upon
delivery to the Government shall each admeasure less
*The contractor shall provide, frame
in required locations
and mount all certificates
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than 300 gross tons. Failure to meet this requirement
will be handled under the contract. The contractor
shall provide the necessary certificates and documen-
tation from the Admeasurement Branch of the U. S.
Coast Guard to attest to this condition.
In the event tonnage openings are utilized, their locations
shall be subject to the approval of the Government and shall
not compromise the utility of the space in which located.
Water ballast shall be provided to maintain proper conditions
of stability, trim, immersion, seakeeping and strength under
varying requirements of the vessels operation. Water ballast
installations shall comply with U. S. Coast Guard -Navi gation
and Vessel Inspection Circular 11-69 of 2 December 1969.
Installation of deep floors shall comply with U. S. Coast
Guard letter (OCMI New Orleans Ser 5949 of 10 December 1969)
entitled Deep Floors in Small Vessels .
B . Care during construction and fire protection
All components and materials used in construction of the
ship shall be properly stored, preserved, installed and
protected. A fire protection and fire fighting system
shall be established which provides 24-hour, 7 day pro-
tection. Combustible material such as used in staging
shall be kept to a minimum and shall be fire retardant.


























Speed (Main propulsion only)
Bollard Pull
Stability (all conditions,
including pay load range from
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s . at 8 kts (cal
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ean hull)
Rahola applied with 6" ice
accumulation.
One compartment at 10' draft.
Bulkhead spacing per USCG
Subchapter U. Penetrations




Total payload weight reser-
vation
Minimum clear deck area on





Fi ref i ghti ng
B . Environmental Conditions
1. Weather air
2. Seawater
8000 miles (taken with
departure from payload
and tankage for 950 ton
displacement and consumed




at 4' above main
3000 square feet
American Bureau of Shipping
Al E with Class C ice
strengthening
Longitudinal, except in
fore and aft body
4-20 man rafts, 16'


























15° up or down from
horizontal
35° from vertical each
si de
The ship and all mechanical, electrical and electronic components
shall be capable of performance through the ranges of environmental
and limiting operational conditions.
At delivery the ships shall have no more than 1/4 degree port
or starboard list and no more than 18 inch trim.
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D. Modes of Operation
1. Cruising; either or both propulsion engines, one
s. s. generator carrying hotel load, no propulsion
thruster.
a. either or both propulsion engines, both s. s.
generators in parallel
2. Open Ocean On Station, Maneuvering in a Channel or
to Dock.
a. one propulsion engine, one propulsion thruster,
one s. s. generator
b. no propulsion engine, one propulsion thruster,
one s. s. generator
3. At anchor or hove to; one s. s. generator carrying
hotel load.
4. Emergency take home; bow propulsion thruster, both
s. s. generators.
5. Engine room unmanned except for starting engines and
generators, paralleling generators and starting vital
auxiliaries.
The ship and all mechanical, electrical and electronic com-




FEATURES REOUIRED ON STANDARD OFFSHORE SUPPLY OR EXPLORATION
VESSELS TO PRODUCE OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIPS
NOTE: Specifications and drawinqs oreoared by proposers shall
reflect these features and those shown on the drawings






2. ABS Class C Ice Strengthening
3. Scantlinqs on superstructure front one category higher
than ABS
4. Forebody with fine entrance, flare, high chine, no
tumbl e-home
5. Main deck/sheer strake intersection radiused (use
split pipe)
6. High bulwarks forward and midships
7. Freeing ports continuous-bulwarks set off above main
deck
8. Raised uptakes
9. Pilot house bridge wings extended to ship sides; long
aft windows
10. Mast and yardarm with 1000 lb. load capability
11. Increased rudder area; rudders with 45°-45° capability
12. Welding and fairing in accordance with ABS, including
insDection and radiography requirements.
a. Radiograph e\/ery main hull butt-seam intersection
Continuous welding on both sides of member in:




b. within ballast and water tanks.
Continuous welding all areas exoosed to the weather
including superstructure
Slugged welds and tack welds on finished areas not
permi tted.
13. Lines and surfaces shall be smooth and fair. Plating
shall be free of unevenness, waviness and wrinkling
and welding.
14. r, a.jor machinery foundations continuously welded; with
long tapers incorporated in foundation design.
15. Zincs in Sea Chests and thruster.
16. Floors to have limber and drainage holes.
17. Bridge wing bulwarks of solid plate.
18. Fresh water tank isolated from hull and other tanks
oer USPHS.
19. Exterior pine rails of 3 courses.
B . M a c h i n e ry
1. Acoustic isolation of engine room and machinery
components .
2. One electro-hydraulic rotatable (through 360°),
retractable thruster, with controls in pilot house
and on both bridge wings.
3. Duolicate fire and bilge pumps.
4. Duplicate sea suctions for above (sea chests with air
or steam connections and ice exclusion).
5. All overboard discharges on port side below 1. w.l
6. Sewage disposal plant (macerator-ch"! ori nator) .
7. Pilot house control in center console of propulsion
engines, thruster; pilot house alarms for machinery
and generators (see drawings, page 8).
8. Spare parts and special tools (Table 4, item 5).
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9. Piping stencilled and valves labelled (name and flow
di recti on)
.
Piping and valves color coded.
10. Manual remote controls for inaccessible valves.
11. Air conditioning plants separate for ship and central
laboratory and pilot house; located inside vice in
weather.
12. Refri aeration plant capable of 0°F freeze.
13. Piping runs from engine room via central tunnel only.
14. Deck shore d. o. and f. w. connections, int'l fire
connection.
15. Deck machinery (p ay load) fill connections with hose.
16. Tanks to shell with dry dock nlugs.
17. Lab uncontami nated s. w. svstem.
18. Takedown joints in oine runs over 20 feet.
19. "Tate-type" valves and screens in vents and overflows.
20. Sounding caps in tODS of vents elbows where terminating
on weather deck.
21. Vents and overflows to terminate adjacent bulkwarks
inside bulkwark brackets.
22. Stack exhaust oining to terminate at least 32 feet
above main deck.
23. Exhaust piping to be hung by shock absorbent hangers
with flexible sections.
24. Padeyes located over as reg ' d major machinery for
lifting and servicing.
25. Hydraulic piping with bleeders at high points and with
vents, and takedown joints.
26. Machinery soace floor olates to have recessed handles




1. Two 250kw diesel generators with front end diesel
power take offs.
2. Ship service switchboard set ud for parallel and inde-
pendent simultaneous operation of generators.
3. Pilot house control of propulsion and thruster mach-
inery; pilot house alarms for critical machinery and
generators .
4. Incandescent exterior deck lighting.
5. Fluorescent interior lighting.
6. Space parts and special tools (Table 4, item 5)
7. Circuit breakers with overload protection.
8
.
All wiring labelled, all circuits labelled.
9. Mot-under-command and task lights per Rules of the
Road (CG-169) Rule 4
10. Emergency lighting, battery op., line floating type.
11. Wire runs neatly banded and firmly secured in wire ways
12. Quick opening means for switchboards and controllers.
13. Penetration tubes for deck and bulkhead cable
penetrations.
14. Space lighting switches located next to door.
15. Pilot house with red night lights.
16. Exterior deck house lighting which face forward with
gl are screens .
17. Shore power connection and cable w/stowage.
Outfit
1. Berthing for 21 scientists and crew.
2. Marlite bulkheads and ceilings (formica clad marine
plywood) .
3. Enclosed stair towers for fire protection.
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4. Flashing of inaccessible corners in quarters, galley,
mess, navigating, public and wash spaces.
5. Stores shelving.
6. Concealed piping and wiring in ouarters, mess and
galley, public spaces, and navigating spaces.
7. Two non-skid pads applied to deck at head and foot of
ladders and stairs (exterior and interior).
3. ?1aximum ladder slope of 50°.
9. Minimum ladder headroom throughout ship, 6'2".
10. Minimum space headroom 6' 4".
11. Minimum ladder width 30".
12. Galvanized sheet metal lining with insulation in
refrigerated space.
13. Temperature insulation lined with marlite or formica
clad plywood.
14. Uninsulated shell bulkheads require anti-sweat pro-
tection ( vermi cul i te )
.
15. Ventilation ducts in quarters, galley, mess, public




16. Bulkhead and ceiling panel seams with mahogany stripping
17. Joiner work smooth and finished; scratches on painted
or finished surfaces touched up.
18. Interior stairways with metal fire screen doors top and
bottom (except pilot house).
19. Locker doors louvered. Joiner doors at stateroom
entrances louvered.
20. Lower berths with two built-in drawers.
21. Drawers with catches.
22. Upper berths with ladders and grabs.
23. All berths with fluorescent berth lights.
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24. Grabs in way of water closets, showers and at heads
of stairs and hatches.
25. Staterooms with bookshelves and coat hooks.
26. Hessroom with coat hooks.
27. Chart stowage and flag stowage in navigation space.
28. Pilot house chart table at least 30" x 48" with drawers
under.
29. Notice frames in mess and navigation spaces.
30. Labelling to be embossed and attached with screws.
31. Exterior storm rails in superstructure.
32. Interior storm rails in machinery access tunnels and
passageways .
33. Rescue boat with built-in flotation tanks.
34. Tow cable and reel (ABS).
E. W. T. Requirements
1. One compartment subdivision.







U. T. bulkhead penetrations limited to distance 1/5
of beam either side of C. L.
W. T. bulkhead and deck penetrations welded on both
sides or with spool pieces-ABS standards.
W. T. doors on inboard sides of stacks.
W. T. bulkheads labelled both sides with frame number
and deck.
W. T. doors labelled both sides starting with lio. 1
forward.
W. T. boundaries and drains all wet spaces with
continuous weldinq in showers, toilet spaces, laundry,
1 abora tory
.




1. Bolt-down fittings for scientific pay load (CPxES
attachments) - see drawings.
2. Transducer dome at forefoot - see drawings.
3. Transducer void in hull.













Vendors equipment drawings** 3
Agendas & Schedules (plan,
purchase, erection, trials) 2
Technical Manuals 3




As completed photos: (color
8"xl0")
B roads i des
Bow (45°off i)










Working drawings must show reference to and interface
with vendors drawings or technical manuals.
*As work progresses, per Article 3 of Contract Special
Provi s i ons
**0ne set of final, as-constructed, placed on each ship
included in the above.
***Progress photos at bi-monthly intervals and photos of
major events and features.
****0ri gi nal s aboard ship, 1 copy to Texas ASM, 1 copy to
University of Hawaii.
!. Required Manuals
Commercial standard instruction manuals for all machinery,
electrical and electronic equipment (excluding fittings
and fixtures).
Laminated operating instructions posted adjacent to main
and auxiliary machinery and electronics.
Tes ts and Tri al
s
1. Prepare test memos for tanks, piping, structure and
hull fittings, main and auxiliary machinery, electrical
and electronic equipment for dock and underway trials.
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2. Tests of all above in accordance with regulatory body
requirements and to demonstrate satisfactory performance
including overloads. Include the following:
a. Dynamometer bollard pull test and main and thruster
propulsion at dock and underway. (only for first
ship)
b. Verify alignment of shaft bearings.
Dock and at sea trials by contractor. Licensed master and
chief engineer provided in contractor's trial crew for
underway trials. At sea trials to consist of proof of
operation of all installed comoonents by means of at least:
a. Four hour full power run
b. Crash stops, starts, reversals
c. Maneuvering tests with main propulsion and with
thrus ter
d. Demonstration of safety and emergency systems
e. Four speed runs over measured course to develop
speed oower curve*
f. Windlass and deck gear operation
g. Verify operating conditions in Table 2C
*a run consists of three passes (up, down, up)
Contractor will conduct two underway trials. The first will
be informal. The second will be witnessed by representatives
of the U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and Survey. Government
representatives will witness all tests and trials. Con-
tractor will provide an agenda of trials three months in
advance. The Government may conduct its own trial at or
near the expiration of the guaranty neriod. The contractor
may attend if he desires.
Spare Parts and Special Tools :
Spares shall be provided for all machinery, electrical and
electronic components.
1. Spares according to ABS and for one year continuous
service on extended voyages away from the continental
U.S. Contractor shall inform every vendor of this
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requirement, for purposes of obtaining list of rec-
ommended spares. Spares shall be purchases and pro-
vided based on these lists and additionally as follows:
Suppl imentary spares in following categories and
amounts :
a. Hardware - 10% of items installed each, all door,
port and miscellaneous fittings (i.e., hinges,
handles, etc.) but no less than one of each kind.
b. Paint - 5 gallons each color and tyDe and sufficient
dimetcote or inorqanic zinc to recoat 500 square
feet.
c. Light bulbs and receptacle fittings - 100% replace-
ment bulbs, 10 receptacle plugs and fittings each
type, 5 spare 115V exterior and interior receptacles
each, 2 spare 460V receptacles.
d. Deck covering - sufficient material and underlay to
re-do largest space in each type.
e. Refriqerant - one spare complete charge each unit
in addition to operating charge.
f. Fuel filters - 200% each type.
g. Injectors - main and auxiliary diesels - 1 set
each size.
h. The follow in a spare parts shall be furnished with
each main and auxiliary diesel engine. Where the
quantity "one set" is referred to. 100% spares
for only one diesel engine shall be furnished. In
cases where left and right hand parts are involved,
sufficient items shall be provided to service both
engines.
1 set, main bearing shells
1 set, connecting rod bearing shells
1 cylinder head assembly complete with valves
and springs
1 set cylinder valves complete with springs,
1 ocks , etc
.
1/2 set cylinder liners
4 sets elements for lubricating and diesel
oil filters
1 diesel oil supply pump (attached)
10 connecting rod bolts and nuts






set injection pumDS (if applicable)
lubricating oil pump of each type (attached)
fresh water pumo (attached)
saltwater pump (attached)




1 set piston rings
1 set valve springs and keepers
1 set oil seals and packinq
2 sets V belts
1- set cylinder head studs and nuts
1 complete overhaul set gaskets, seals
and packing at least 2 of each kind and
size of special pipe, tubing or fittings
used for starting air, lubricating oil,
cooling water, diesel oil and any other
SDecial lines used.
3. All special tools, including torque wrench for setting
engine bolts, required for maintenance of hull fittings,
machinery, electrical and electronic units.
4. Spares and repair parts shall be furnished in domestic
wooden shipping containers or sheet steel boxes.
Outside of container stenciled with eouipment name.
Provide typed list of components inside container.
Provide stowage and snare parts location plan. In
general stow spare parts adjacent to components located
in machinery space. Locate other spare parts in
machinery access tunnels (in shelving located along
passageway bulkheads.)
6 . Stability, Inclining and Measurement
1. Weight and stability reports submitted to Government at
three equal time periods during construction to indicate
compliance with stability requirements.
2. Inclining test in accordance with Coast Guard require-
ments (first ship only).
3. Prepare stability booklet and loading instruction.
4. Gross tonnage reports submitted to Government at three
equal time periods during construction to indicate
gross tonnage maintenance under 300 gross tons.
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7. Contractor's Working Drawings, Plans and Data
1. Contractor developed data not limited to following list
but shall include all drawings necessary to produce
vessel in accordance with these requirements:
a. Inboard and outboard profiles.*
b. General arrangements (showing location of fire
fighting, lifesaving, equipment).*
c. Lines , offsets .
d. Plating framing, bulkheads, house, rudder, append-
ages, other structural and foundation drawings.
e. Tank capacity table.*
f. Curves of form, cross curves, bonjean curves.
g. Tonnage diagram,
h . Docki nq pi an
.
i. HVAC arrangement and fan list.
j. Machinery arrangement.
k. Pilot house and engine room controls, diagrams and
arrangements .
1. Shafting, propellers, steering septem.
m. Thruster.
n. Piping systems, diagrams and arrangements.
o. One line power analysis; power and lighting
distribution.
p. '!otor and controller list.
q. Navigation lights, antennas and superstructure
appendages .
r. Hast and cableways.
s. Interior communications, electronics, communications
systems .
t. Scientific payload interfaces.
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u. Stability booklet and loading instructions.
b. Stowage and spareparts location plan, list or key
*Additional copy shall be framed and placed on ship,
mounted in main deck passage
Del i very
After completion of the following events the Government



































on of at sea trials.
on of known deficiencies
all required certi ci cates .
of all contractor furnished spare parts,
of all waste, debris and items used in the
tion of the vessel. Clean up of the vessel an
where required.
pc.
g, collision or launching damage. v.uu
liable for correction of defects from such
Clean and di sin-
deli very at con-
ice of grounding,
Contractor
lubeoil on board at time of delivery shall be










Contract number - N00024-72-C-0288
Date of Contract - 23 June 1972
Quant i ty and description of vessels
a. AGOR-21 R/V Gyre
b. AGOR-22 R/V Moana Wave
c. Characteri sties:
Length overall 174 ft.
Beam 36 ft.





price for two ships $1,894,000.00
b. Adjustments in price
resulting from supplemental ..i
agreements negotiated by DCASO 4,106.50
c. Adjustments in price
resulting from negotiating by
NAVSEA
d. Other adjustments:
Liquidated damages Mod P00003




f. Final Price for
























$1 ,989,073.50 $1,955,427.09 $3,982,677.89
Delivery schedule per original contract
AGOR-21 - 23 August 1973
AGOR-22 - 23 September 1973
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6. Delivery schedule per contract as revised.
a. Modification P00002 dated 28 September 1973 changes
the delivery dates to:
AGOR-21 - 12 October 1973
AGOR-22 - 16 November 1973, and changes the dates for
start of the one month grace periods to:
AGOR-21 - 7 September 1973
AGOR-22 - 5 October 1973
b. Modification P00003 dated October 1974 changes the
deli very dates to:
AGOR-21 - 14 November 1973
AGOR-22 - 16 January 1974, and changes the dates for
start of the one month grace period to:
AGOR-21 - 11 October 1973
AGOR-22 - 29 October 1973
7. Actual delivery schedule.
AGOR-21 - 14 Novemberl973
AGOR-22 - 16 January 1974
8. Major subcontractors:
Catapillar, Lieaen, Con-Select, Carrier, etc.
9. Conditions requiring administrative action during per-
formance of the contract.
a. None - No Government property.
b. Laxness in Contractor's security measures.
There were no cl assi fi ed documents on this contract
for which performance can be measured.
c. Failure of the Contractor to maintain good safety
and fire protection measures.
All adequate as far as records or memory shows.
B. Contractor Comments
C. NRPO Rating and Comments
1
.
W o r k ratings:
All work appeared to be above average.
lf)Q

2. Number and dollar magnitude of INSURV work list the
general rating by IMSURV work list the general ratina by





Most of the above items were completed immediately after
preliminary acceptance trials and prior to delivery. The
remainder were included with the final acceptance trial items
and the defects and deficiencies. A dollar magnitude was not
determi ned.
3. Number of remaining PAT items and deficiencies





The INSURV ratings were generally satisfactory, indicating that
the ships were constructed in accordance with contract speci-





a. Scope and effectiveness of Contractor's inspection
(1) Hull Area - Generally satisfactory
(2) Electrical Area - Generally satisfactory
(3) Electronic Area - Generally satisfactory
(4) Mechanical Area - Generally satisfactory
b. Management including supervision and effectiveness
c. Design performance.
(1) Design oerformance was satisfactory.
d. Planning, scheduling and coordination between
engineering and production.
e. Technical competence.
(1) The Contractor was technically competent. It
is believed that the Contractor's supervision and labor was
above average.
f. Handling of escalation.
(1) The contract did not provide for escalation.
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g. Choice of subcontractors and inspection of sub-
contractors' work.
(1) The Contractor's choice of subcontractors
was satisfactory.
h. Purchase, storage, segregation of material and
material handling.
(1) The Contractor performed these functions
satisfactorily and in accordance with accepted commercial
practi ces
.
i. Performance difficulties and steps taken to overcome
these difficulties.
(1) The Contractor was quick to comply with any and
all new requirements in the administration and execution of
the contract.
(2) The Contractor accepted change orders and
accomplished the work in a timely manner.
j. Contractor's compliance with requests for estimates
in connection with proposed changes.
(1) Change order administration' was handled by
DCASO, Houston. Estimates were usually handled satisfactorily.
k. Promptness in submitting scope, proposals and/or
claims for changes.
(1) The Contractor readily submitted meaningful
scopes of work required under changes. Generally the Contractor's
proposals were submitted in a timely and satisfactory manner.
1. Reasonableness of such proposals and claims.
(1) The DCASO feels that the Contractor's proposals
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